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Abstract We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corrup-
tion and capital account restrictions. Corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital
controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenue. If controls
exist, however, individuals try to mitigate the burden by offering bribes, thereby increasing
corruption. We test the model using panel data for 80 countries over the period 1984–2002
and find that corruption and restrictions indeed affect each other. Government’s attempts to
increase revenue via controls on capital might thus invoke a restrictions-rent-seeking spiral
with destructively high levels of both. Using capital controls to increase revenue should be
reconsidered.
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1 Introduction
According to the World Bank (2008), corruption is “among the greatest obstacles to eco-
nomic and social development.” The World Bank estimates that more than US $1 trillion
is paid in bribes each year (World Bank Institute 2007; Eigen 2008). As corruption thus
represents one of the major “taxes” on economic agents it has won increasing interest in the
economics literature.1 Capital controls, in turn, are also widespread across the world, espe-
cially in Sub-Saharan Africa (Asiedu and Lien 2003). Their major purpose is to increase
tax revenue and to reduce the danger of financial and bank crises (Milesi-Ferretti 1998). In
addition, some institutions and politicians favour such controls to stem the effects of glob-
alization.
The relationship between corruption and capital flows has frequently been investigated
without, however, providing consistent results. While some studies show that corruption
reduces capital imports (Smarzynska and Wei 2000; Wei 2000; Drabek and Payne 2001),
others do not find any significant correlation (Wheeler and Mody 1992; Alesina and Weder
2002).2 As Bai and Wei (2001) argue, more corrupt countries are more likely to impose cap-
ital controls because corruption reduces a government’s ability to collect tax revenue. Ac-
cording to Edwards (1999), DeLong and Eichengreen (2002), and El-Shagi (2005a, 2005b,
2006, 2007), however, capital controls may breed corruption. If controls exist, individuals
try to mitigate the burden by offering side payments and bribes.3 Shleifer and Vishny (1993)
emphasize that the imposition of capital controls creates a bottleneck that investors have to
pass, thereby easing the collection of bribes (rent-seeking).4 Combining the two lines of ar-
gumentation, we hypothesize a mutual relationship between corruption and capital account
restrictions.
We demonstrate how such a mutual relationship may develop in a formal model and
confront our hypotheses with data. In our framework, capital account restrictions are used
by governments to increase tax revenue: restrictions reduce foreign investments by inlan-
ders, which are difficult to observe for the government. Hence domestic investments, which
are easier to observe, increase, and the government’s tax revenue rises. However, suchlike
restrictions cause corruption, since they reduce the net benefits of investors and so cre-
ate an incentive to circumvent these restrictions by engaging in bribery. Moreover, given
the restrictions and the demand of investors to avoid them, bureaucrats have an incentive
to arrange for hidden payments for reducing the burden of controls on investors. Then, in
turn, the government is forced to tighten capital account restrictions, which might imply
destructive competition between the government and investors. Hence, we follow a public
choice perspective where corruption is a consequence of rational behavior of primarily self-
1Dreher and Herzfeld (2008) provide a recent survey. See also Jain (2001).
2Aidt and Gassebner (2007) show that such a relationship also extends to international trade as they identify
red-tape and corruption as one reason why autocratic regimes trade less compared to democracies.
3To some extent, corruption might thus be efficient. However, Wei (2000) finds no evidence for the “effi-
cient grease hypothesis,” and Méon and Sekkat (2005) rather find some evidence that corruption sands the
wheels of the system. According to Dreher et al. (2007), the losses in per capita GDP due to corruption are
substantial. To the contrary, Méon and Weill (2006) show that corruption indeed reduces aggregate efficiency
in countries where institutions are effective, but increases efficiency when institutions are ineffective. Dreher
and Gassebner (2007) also find that corruption greases the wheels.
4Lambsdorff (2006, p. 32) and Jain (2001, pp. 93–94) show that rent-seeking behavior in order to attain bribes
may lead to overinvestment in areas where the opportunities to arrange for hidden payments are better and to
underinvestment in areas where these opportunities are weaker.
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interested individuals in a given system of incentives (Shughart 2006).5 Confronting our
hypotheses with data, we find evidence that corruption and capital account restrictions are
indeed mutually determined.
This bears important policy implications. Clearly, advantages and drawbacks of con-
trols have to be carefully considered. They hold the risk of a destructive “capital account
restrictions-corruption spiral.”6
We proceed as follows. The next section presents the formal model, while Sect. 3 de-
scribes our method and data. Results are shown in Sect. 4; the final section concludes.
2 Formal model
Consider a small open economy populated by a continuum of homogenous households. The
representative household is endowed with wealth normalized to unity. It maximizes capital
income by investing domestically and abroad. The domestic rate of return is given by r
and the rate abroad by r∗. The fraction of wealth invested at home is denoted by d and the
fraction invested abroad by d∗.
The government finances its planned expenditures of size E by capital income taxes.
Let t denote the tax rate per unit of capital earnings. For simplicity, we assume that capital
income earned abroad cannot be observed7 and hence that none of it is reported to the
tax office. It follows that the household prefers investing abroad, so that the government
does not generate sufficient revenue to finance E. Therefore, the government introduces
a capital account restriction c to reduce tax evasion.8 In general, there are two types of
capital controls: (i) controls that levy an extra cost on foreign investment and function as a
tax on investments abroad, that is, they lower the rate of net return on foreign investment,
for instance, due to discriminating exchange rates (indirect capital controls): r∗ = r∗(c) with
∂r∗(c)/∂c < 0; (ii) controls that function as quotas and restrict the amount of wealth allowed
to be invested abroad (direct capital controls): d∗ ≤ d¯∗(c) with ∂d¯∗(c)/∂c < 0. Both tools
decrease the incentive for investing abroad and thus increase the incentive to invest at home:
d = d(c) with ∂d(c)/∂c > 0. The government chooses the level of control c such that the
tax revenue suffices to finance state expenditures E:9
t · d(c) · r = E (1)
5For a recent treatment of the relevance of the rational choice approach see the special Public Choice issue
on terrorism (Vol. 128, pp. 1–2, 2006), and in particular Rowley (2006).
6See also the vicious-circle argumentation in Krueger (1974, 1993).
7Burgess and Stern (1993) report that capital gains earned abroad are difficult for the tax institutions to
observe.
8Using capital controls to solve the problem that taxing foreign income is infeasible has been, for instance,
proposed by Eaton (1987). As we do, he emphasizes that this benefit needs to be weighed against social costs
like the rent-seeking activity that these controls impose. In reality, capital controls may also be perceived as
unfair, and might thus reduce tax compliance (Hasseldine and Bebbington 1991).
9Arguably, capital controls are sometimes also used to increase the independence of monetary policy, to
promote foreign currency reserves, to protect undeveloped markets and infant industries from foreign com-
petition, or to stem capital outflows to reduce the risk of international financial crises (Stockman and Her-
nandez 1988; Milesi-Ferretti 1998; Neely 1999; Alfaro 2001). However, a major motivation for introduc-
ing capital account restrictions is to stem capital flight that is undertaken to avoid or evade capital in-
come taxes, as in our model, since capital gains abroad can hardly be monitored (Burgess and Stern 1993;
Bartolini and Drazen 1997; Bai and Wei 2001). There is a trade-off between increasing tax rate t on the one
hand and stricter controls on the other. Whereas stricter controls increase corruption, higher taxes increase
the stimulus for tax evasion and avoidance. Hence the tax effect is an alternative variety of the same story.
We abstract from this complication for reasons of simplicity.
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However, given the capital control, the representative investor has an incentive to circum-
vent it by bribing the government officials who monitor the capital account restrictions.
Bureaucrats, in turn, attempt to increase their level of compensation by accepting bribes,
so that there is bureaucratic corruption (Büchner et al. 2008; Mbaku 1991, 1996). That is,
bureaucrats behave self-interestedly and adapt to the change of incentives induced by the in-
troduction of the capital account restriction.10 We assume that when there are indirect capital
controls, the net return on foreign investment can be increased by bribing officials, and when
there are direct capital controls, bribery allows augmenting foreign investment. If we denote
the amount of wealth used for bribery by b > 0, we thus obtain:11 ∂r∗(c, b)/∂b > 0 and




d · (1 − t)r + d∗ · r∗(c, b) s.t. d + d∗ + b ≤ 1 and d, d∗, b ≥ 0, (2)
and in the case of direct controls (type (ii)),
max
{d,d∗,b}
d · (1− t)r +d∗ ·r∗ s.t. d +d∗ +b ≤ 1, d∗ ≤ d¯∗(b) and d, d∗, b ≥ 0. (3)
Hence, there are three representative agents—the government, its official, and an investor.
We assume that the official is corrupt,12 but that the government is not. That is, capital
controls are solely introduced for ensuring the financing of state expenditures.
This approach abstracts from other rent-seeking behavior of bureaucrats, politicians
and other interest groups (e.g., Stigler 1971; Krueger 1974; Posner 1974; Peltzman 1976;
Bhagwati 1982; Becker 1983; Mbaku 1991, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny 1993; Duso 2005).
Lobby groups try to distort governments’ decisions to attract rents, and Lambsdorff (2002,
p. 98) emphasizes that there is no reason to believe that governments themselves are im-
mune to corruption. This strand of literature highlights that institutions like taxes or tariffs
are not created to be socially efficient, but serve the interests of those with the bargaining
power to create them (North 1994, p. 360). In such an alternative setting the appearance of
corruption would be volitional, in order to generate private earnings. To focus on the reci-
procity of corruption and controls we abstract from this complication. This guarantees that
the model remains tractable and illustrates the major mechanisms of transmission between
corruption and capital account restrictions. In the empirical analysis and in the conclusion
we will discuss the effects of additional rent-seeking behavior.
In scenario (i), arbitrage equilibrium demands that the net rates of return on investment
abroad and at home are equalized. The world market rate of return, labelled r¯∗, cannot be
influenced by the small economy, but the capital control reduces the net return of inlanders
and corruption increases this rate. Thus, the equilibrium level of domestic investment, de-
noted by deq, is determined by condition (1 − t)r = r∗(c, b) and the equilibrium level of
10This follows the tradition of public choice by dropping the implicit orthodox faith in benevolent bureaucrats
(Shughart and Tollison 2005). We apply the rational-actor model of economics to a problem of bureaucracy.
11We do not model the fact that the bribee and the investor bargain about the size of the bribe. In our model,
there is implicitly a one-off fixed price demanded by the official that is exogenous for the investor. This keeps
the model tractable. An analysis of the bargaining about the size of the bribe can be found in Büchner et al.
(2008), Rose-Ackerman (1997), or Shleifer and Vishny (1993). We also abstract from including the use of
the bribe earnings of the officials, since this has no relevant effect on our investigation.
12Mbaku (1991) has shown that bureaucratic corruption significantly increases the public employee’s total
compensation in Africa.
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corruption, beq, by d∗,eq · ∂r∗(c, beq)/∂b = (1 − t)r . The left-hand side of the last equa-
tion represents the marginal benefit from bribing officials and thus is the marginal willing-
ness to pay bribes, determined mainly by the effectiveness of bribing, given by derivative
∂r∗(c, beq)/∂b. At the optimum, the willingness to pay bribes must be equal to (1 − t)r ,
which represents the marginal cost of paying one unit of bribe, where these marginal costs
decrease with the tax rate on capital gains. Overall, we obtain beq = b(c) with ∂beq/∂c ≥ 0.
If, alternatively, the capital control is of type (ii), household optimum is described by
[r¯∗ − (1 − t)r] · ∂d¯∗(beq)
∂b
= (1 − t)r, d∗,eq = d¯∗(beq) and deq = 1 − d¯∗(beq) − beq, where the
left-hand side of the first term again determines the marginal willingness to pay bribes, given
by the marginal benefit of bribing, and the right-hand side of the first term again represents
the marginal cost of bribing. Therefore, the marginal willingness to bribe is determined
by the net interest rate differential and by the effectiveness of bribing, given by derivative
∂d¯∗(beq)/∂b. Note that in case (ii) we have dc = −dd¯∗. Hence, we conclude beq = b(c)
with ∂beq/∂c ≥ 0.
Turning to the government’s behavior, we supplement corruption to objective function (1)
and arrive at:
t · d(c, b) · r = E. (4)
The government takes into account that ∂d(c, b)/∂c > 0 and ∂d(c, b)/∂b < 0. It follows that
the required level of control is an increasing function of the degree of bribery:13 ceq = c(b)
with ∂c(·)/∂b > 0.
The investor and the government therefore play a Cournot game, with b(c) and c(b)
representing the reaction functions of the investor and of the government, respectively. The
Nash equilibrium is deduced by equating the two reaction functions b(c) and c−1(b).14
In order to compute the equilibrium we specify r∗(c, b) ≡ r¯∗ − α · c + β · b and focus
on the more realistic type (i). Applying first-order condition (1 − t)r = r¯∗ − α · c + β · b
we find b(c) = α·c−[r¯∗−(1−t)r]
β
. That is, corruption increases with a stricter capital control and
with an increasing effectiveness of controls (α), and decreases with increasing effectiveness
of bribing (β) and with the net interest differential in general equilibrium.15 We thus obtain:




If we now use first-order condition d∗ · β = r¯∗ − α · c + β · b, we obtain d∗(b, c) =
1
β
(r¯∗ + β · b − α · c). Setting d∗(b, c) and b(c) into E = t · r · (1 − d∗ − b), we find the
reaction function of the government: c(b) = 1
α
[r¯∗ + β · ( E
t ·r + 2 · b − 1)]. We see that the
restriction becomes stricter when the level or the effectiveness of corruption increases. We
thus infer:
13There is also evidence that more corrupt states in the United States have lower bond ratings, and hence may
pay higher interest on public debt (Depken and Lafountain, 2006).
14If we assume that the government is a dominant player that moves first, the investor and the government
play a von Stackelberg game. Then equilibrium is found by determining that point at the reaction function of
the representative investor which generates the highest value of the government’s objective function. In our
model this is equivalent to the Cournot outcome.
15Given a diminishing-rate-of-return technology, the excess supply of capital caused by the capital account
restriction decreases the domestic net rate of return.
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Equalizing the two reaction functions, we obtain:





r · t −








Though our model is stylized, the result of a reinforcing corruption-restrictions link is an
important aspect for economic policies building on the usage of capital account restrictions.
The reinforcing relationship holds analogously if the government increases the tax rate in-
stead of tightening capital controls: higher tax rates increase the stimulus for tax evasion and
avoidance; if public servants collude with taxpayers, this will also involve increased corrup-
tion.16 Alternatively, the government could intensify the fight against corruption. However,
Friehe (2008) shows that harsher anti-corruption measures may increase the incentives to
engage in crime. Hence, even anti-corruption strategies may, to some extent, generate dead-
weight losses.17
The conclusion from Propositions 1 to 3, to be inspected empirically, is the following:
Proposition 4 Capital account restrictions and corruption determine each other mutually.
3 Data and econometric approach
In the following we empirically test for the relationship between corruption and capital
account restrictions predicted by our theoretical model.
To measure corruption, we employ an index of perceived corruption provided by the
International Country Risk Guide. This indicator is based on the analysis of a world-wide
network of experts. It is well suited to test the predictions of our model.18 The index is
ordinal and ranges from 0–6. We rescaled the original index, so that higher values represent
more corruption.
Our indicator of capital account restrictions is constructed with binary data from the
International Monetary Fund’s annual report Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Re-
strictions. The IMF data are the most widely used measures of capital controls and allow
16Roine (2006) shows that tax avoidance does not necessarily lead to higher official tax rates in political
equilibrium. If the tax avoidance technology is effective, however, it is even possible that a coalition of poor
and the very richest favour a higher tax rate in equilibrium.
17Nonetheless fighting corruption is an important building block of a good development strategy. Analyses
of fighting corruption could be found, for instance, in Mbaku (1996) or Boehm (2007). See also Lambsdorff
(2007). See Nell and Lambsdorff (2007) for an interesting proposal designing asymmetric penalties and
leniency among bribe takers and givers.
18Note that the focus of this index is on capturing political risk involved in corruption. Since it is the only
perception-based data on corruption providing consistent time series, the index has been widely used in em-
pirical studies. Dreher et al. (2007) provide an alternative index which is partly based on hard data. However,
the data are not available for most of the years we cover here, so we do not use it.
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an almost universal coverage of countries. We focus on four forms of restrictions to mea-
sure the set of capital controls: (i) restrictions on payments for capital account transactions,
(ii) separate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions and/or some or all invis-
ibles, and (iii) surrender requirements for proceeds from exports, invisible transactions, or
both; since current transactions can be used to circumvent restrictions on the capital account
(Milesi-Ferretti 1998, p. 225),19 we also include (iv) restrictions for payments on current
transactions. We apply an index of restrictions that aggregates the four measures. The index
takes the value of four for fully restricted capital accounts, and zero, if no restrictions are in
place.20 As an obvious shortcoming of this approach, our index neither measures the inten-
sity nor the effectiveness of controls. One would also like to distinguish between controls on
inflows of capital and those on outflows. We do, however, neither have the data to adequately
control for intensity and effectiveness,21 nor those for an analysis of inflows and outflows.
To assess the relationship between corruption and restrictions, we use a panel of 80 low
and middle income countries (listed in Appendix C).22 Our data cover the years 1984–2002.
We employ averages over three years for all variables. This makes the indices of corruption
and capital account restrictions continuous with values ranging between zero (no corruption)
and six (high corruption) and, respectively, zero (not restricted) and four (fully restricted).
By making the dependent variables less discrete, we can use linear estimation methods.23
Some of the data are not available for all countries or every year. Therefore, our panel data
are unbalanced and the number of observations depends on the choice of explanatory vari-
ables. All variables, their precise definitions and data sources are listed in Appendix A, while
Appendix B provides summary statistics.
Column 1 of Table 1 shows the estimates of the effect of capital account restrictions on
corruption, estimated with OLS. To account for time-invariant unobservable heterogeneity
potentially correlated with the regressor, we use a fixed effects specification (which is clearly
favored over random effects by the Hausman test). Therefore, we could not include variables
that do not change over time.24 We also tested for fixed time effects but found them to be
insignificant.
Following Lederman et al. (2001), we tested for the influence of four groups of control
variables broadly relating to the political system, cultural factors, government policies, and
a country’s degree of development.25 We started by including the groups of variables one at
a time in addition to the index of capital account restrictions. In column (1), we include all
19In 1997, the IMF changed the format of its survey. Following Glick and Hutchison (2005) we coded “re-
strictions on payments for capital account transactions” to be unity if controls were in place in 5 or more of
the sub-categories of capital account restrictions, and “financial credit” was one of the categories restricted.
20A similar procedure has been employed, e.g., by Gruben and McLeod (2001) and Bai and Wei (2001).
21To proxy the intensity or effectiveness of capital controls, black market premiums, onshore-offshore interest
rate differentials and deviations from covered interest parity have been employed (cf., e.g., Dooley and Isard
1980; Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). However, those variables measure other aspects as well.
22According to the recent analysis of Weber Abramo (2008) pooling industrialized and developing countries,
when analyzing corruption, is clearly inadequate. We therefore exclude high income countries according to
the definition of the World Bank (2006), i.e., countries in which 2004 gross national income per capita was
US $10,066 or more.
23Given the bounded nature of our variables of interest, we replicate the analysis with Tobit. As described
below, the main results are unchanged.
24Like dummies for developing countries, for example, or institutional measures that have been shown to
affect economic performance (Knack and Keefer 1995).
25We employed the following variables: (i) an index for the competitiveness of nominating candidates for the
legislature, indices measuring legislature fractionalization of the government and, respectively, the opposition,
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Table 1 Corruption and capital
account restrictions (panel data,
80 countries, 1984–2002, OLS,
fixed effects)
Notes: The dependent variable is
the ICRG index of corruption in
column (1) and the index of
capital account restrictions in
column (2). (Robust) t-statistics
in parentheses:
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
*: significant at the 10% level.
All variables are averages over
three years
(1) (2)
Capital account restrictions 0.111
(2.42)**




Left governments, dummy 0.024
(0.11)















Number of countries 80 78
R-squared 0.10 0.24
variables that have been significant at the 10% level at least according to these preliminary
specifications.
As can be seen, the only significant covariate is democracy, which reduces corruption
at the 1% level of significance.26 The positive impact of democracy is in line with several
studies surveyed in Lambdsdorff (2006, pp. 10–17). If corruption is high, the government
will be punished in the next election, so that political competition decreases the level of cor-
ruption in democracies (Schumpeter 1942; Rose-Ackerman 1978, p. 281). In line with our
finding, Gerring and Thacker (2004) and Treisman (2000) provide evidence that democracy
significantly reduces corruption.27
a dummy which takes the value one if the IMF classifies the exchange rate of the respective country as fixed,
and zero otherwise, (ii) the share of Protestants in the population, as other cultural variables available do not
vary over time, (iii) total government revenue/spending as a share of GDP, a country’s exports and imports
relative to GDP, and (iv) GDP per capita and rates of illiteracy.
26Goel and Nelson (1998) show that government size has a strong positive effect on corruption in the U.S.
However, in our panel, we do not find evidence for this channel. We also do not find evidence that economic
openness decreases corruption (as do Ades and di Tella 1999).
27As Rose-Ackerman (1999) emphasizes, serious imbalances in political power can foster corruption. Hence,
established democracies have lower levels of corruption. See also Jain (2001, pp. 82–83). Karahan et al.’s
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Turning to the impact of capital account restrictions, column (1) also shows that corrup-
tion indeed increases with restrictions, at the 5% level of significance (in line with Propo-
sition 1). The coefficient is quantitatively relevant. A reduction in the intensity of controls
by one point (i.e., the abolition of one restriction) leads to a decrease in corruption by 0.11
points. This amounts to, e.g., the difference in the index of corruption between Australia and
Switzerland, or between Austria and Portugal over the period 1999–2002.
Column (2) employs the index of capital account restrictions as the dependent variable
instead. Again, the Hausman test rejects the random effects model, so we include a dummy
for each country. As covariates, we employed variables usually included in regressions try-
ing to explain restrictions on the capital account, focusing on three groups of variables: The
first group contains variables accounting for the political system, and political as well as
economic crises. We, second, include variables measuring the degree of development, sug-
gested by Brune et al. (2001), and, finally, economic variables. Again, we initially included
each group of variables separately, and kept those that have been significant at the 10% level
at least.
As can be seen, a larger population, lower monetary growth and higher GDP growth
lead to fewer restrictions, at the 1% level of significance. Smaller countries derive more
benefits from integration and are therefore more likely to have open capital accounts. Capital
flight is more attractive with higher money growth, since domestic interest rates tend to fall.
Countries with lower rates of economic growth might feel the need to liberalize in order to
attract foreign capital.
Smaller gross domestic savings reduce restrictions at the 1% level of significance. Ar-
guably, restrictions become more attractive when savings are high. In this specification,
left-wing governments, trade openness and GDP per capita do not significantly influence
restrictions, even though they had been significant in the preliminary regressions.28
Turning to our variable of interest, the index of corruption is significant at the 5% level.
Its coefficient shows that an increase in corruption by one point leads to 0.16 points more
restrictions on the capital account. This is well in line with Proposition 2.
In summary, our results are in line with the theoretical model introduced above. Corrup-
tion and capital account restrictions do indeed affect each other mutually.
We proceed with investigating this mutual relationship in more detail and test for
Granger-causality between these two variables.
To test for the direction of relationship between controls and corruption we use a dynamic
model. Causality is defined in the sense of Granger (1969). That is, a (stationary) variable x
is (Granger-)causing a (stationary) variable y if past values of x help to explain y, once the
past influence of y has been accounted for.







βjxi,t−j + αi + ui,t , (5)
(2006) finding that voter turnout in Mississippi is higher in corrupt than in non-corrupt counties sup-
ports Rose-Ackerman’s hypothesis that corruption is punished in democratic election. Kunicová and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) provide evidence that proportional representation systems are associated with higher levels
of corrupt political rent-seeking. We cannot test this given the fixed effects setup employed here.
28In addition to these variables, we included an index of political instability constructed in Dreher (2006).
The index turned out to be completely insignificant. Note that our results are only partly in line with those of
Brune et al. (2001). For a sample of developing countries, they find in particular that richer and more open
countries had more open capital accounts. However, Brune et al. focus on a substantially different sample and
do not account for corruption, as we do.
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Table 2 Granger-causality tests on corruption and capital account restrictions (panel data, 80 countries,
1984–2002, OLS)
Corruption Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Restrictions (t-1) −0.10** 0.01 −0.03 Corruption (t-1) 0.16*** 0.02 0.10
Restrictions (t-2) −0.06 −0.09 Corruption (t-2) 0.24*** 0.04
Restrictions (t-3) 0.15 Corruption (t-3) 0.35***
Corruption (t-1) 0.55*** 0.68*** 0.49*** Restrictions (t-1) 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.57***
Corruption (t-2) −0.45*** −0.45*** Restrictions (t-2) −0.19*** −0.20**








0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Notes:
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
All variables are averages over three years
where i = 1, . . . ,N and t = 1, . . . , T . The parameters are denoted aj and βj , the maximal
lag length is m, αi represents unobserved individual effects and ui,t is an independently and
identically distributed stochastic error.
Given that Granger causality tests are based on the assumption that the series are station-
ary, we have to test this assumption beforehand.29 We employ the unit root test proposed
by Maddala and Wu (1999) for panel data.30 Specifically, the Maddala-Wu test consists in
first testing the unit root for each cross-sectional unit separately. We determine the optimal
number of lags to be included using the Ng and Perron (1995) sequential t-test on the high-
est order lag coefficient. Based on the p-values of the individual unit root tests, the overall
Maddala-Wu test statistic is calculated. Note, however, that the time dimension of our panel
consists of seven observations only and is thus rather short. Consequently, we cannot expect
the panel unit root test to provide reliable evidence. The results are suggestive rather than
definitive. Still, the hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 1% level for corruption and
capital account restrictions alike.
Table 2 proceeds with the test for Granger-causality and shows mixed results. As can be
seen, corruption is significantly affected by capital account restrictions when one lag of both
variables is included, but not for lag length two and three. Corruption affects restrictions at
the 1% level of significance, to the contrary, independent of the number of lags included.
In order to account for potential endogeneity we apply the system GMM estimator as
suggested by Arellano and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond
29We thank a referee for pointing this out.
30We employ the Maddala-Wu test rather than other unit root tests as it is applicable to our unbalanced panel
data set.
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Table 3 Granger-causality tests on corruption and capital account restrictions (panel data, 80 countries,
1984–2002, GMM)
Corruption Restrictions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Restrictions (t-1) −0.18*** 0.02 −0.07 Corruption (t-1) 0.19** 0.17* 0.04
Restrictions (t-2) −0.13** −0.11 Corruption (t-2) 0.01 −0.17
Restrictions (t-3) −0.002 Corruption (t-3) 0.12
Corruption (t-1) 0.79*** 0.82*** 0.84*** Restrictions (t-1) 0.89*** 0.95*** 0.95***
Corruption (t-2) −0.27*** −0.43*** Restrictions (t-2) −0.17** −0.27**
Corruption (t-3) 0.20 Restrictions (t-3) 0.10
Arrelano-Bond test
(p-value)
0.02 0.10 0.84 0.03 0.12 0.70
Sargan-Hansen test
(p-value)








0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.15 0.59
Notes:
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
All variables are averages over three years
(1998). Results are based on the two-step estimator implemented by Roodman (2007) in
Stata, including Windmeijer’s (2005) finite sample correction.
Table 3 presents the results. The null hypothesis that restrictions have no effect on cor-
ruption can be rejected for lag length one and two. For lag length one, the same is true if
we use restrictions as the dependent variable and test for the influence of corruption. We
conclude that taking corruption and capital account restrictions as exogenous determinants
of each other is at least questionable. Simultaneity may be an issue even if the Granger test
rejects causality (see Granger 1969; Engle et al. 1983). Given the results of our tests, we do
not pursue the issue further.
Table 4 proceeds by estimating corruption and capital account restrictions simultane-
ously, which amounts to a direct test of our theoretical model. We employ two-stage least
squares (2SLS), which allows for the inclusion of endogenous regressors that are dependent
variables from other equations in the system. We replicate the regressions of Table 1, but
instrument corruption and restrictions with their respective explanatory variables.
As can be seen in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, the results are similar to those presented
above. Democracy reduces corruption at the 1% level of significance. The results regarding
capital account restrictions are very similar to those reported previously—both qualitatively
and quantitatively. According to the results, restrictions on the capital account breed cor-
ruption, whereas corruption leads to more restrictions, with coefficients significant at the
10% level of significance. Compared to the individual estimations, the coefficients show a
somewhat stronger impact. A reduction in the intensity of controls by one point (i.e., the
abolition of one restriction) leads to a decrease in corruption by 0.17 points. An increase in
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Table 4 Determinants of corruption and capital account restrictions (panel data, 78 countries, 1984–2002,
2SLS, fixed effects)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital account Corruption Capital account Corruption





Left governments, dummy −0.011 −0.583
(0.06) (1.21)






Monetary growth 0.0003 −0.000
(2.88)*** (0.06)
Gross domestic savings 0.033 0.037
(3.99)*** (1.71)*
gdp growth −0.027 −0.027
(2.26)** (1.06)
Capital account restrictions 0.170 0.548
(1.83)* (2.28)**
Index of democracy −0.069 0.004
(4.02)*** (0.09)
Constant 36.592 −4.087 44.771 −4.784
(4.98)*** (10.41)*** (4.09)*** (4.79)***
Observations 404 404 124 124
Number of countries 78 78 27 27
First stage F-statistic 15.72 11.75 7.16 4.54
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.63 0.03
Notes: Instruments for corruption (capital account restrictions) are the covariates used in Table 1. t-statistics in
parentheses:
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
*: significant at the 10% level
All variables are averages over three years
corruption by one point leads to 0.52 points more restrictions on the capital account. Ac-
cording to the results, the Sargan-Hansen test does not reject the overidentifying restrictions
at conventional levels of significance in the corruption equation.31 The Anderson canonical
31Note that there are no overidentifying restrictions in the capital restrictions equation.
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correlations LR statistic and the Cragg-Donald chi-sq statistic—both tests of whether the
equation is identified—also do not reject the specifications at conventional levels of sig-
nificance. F-tests on the joint significance of the instruments in the first stage regressions
(conditional on all exogenous variables in the system) show that they are good predictors
of corruption and, respectively, capital account restrictions, significant at the 1% level. The
F-statistics also exceed the critical rule-of thumb value of 10 (Staiger and Stock 1997).
In columns 3 and 4 we test for the robustness of our results to using an alternative index
of corruption. The index is provided by Transparency International (2003) and ranges from
zero to 10. We rescaled the index so that higher values represent more corruption. In terms
of statistical significance, the results are even stronger than before: At the 5% level capital
account restrictions rise with more corruption, while corruption increases with more restric-
tions. Note, however, that the sample is reduced to 124 observations from 27 countries and
the Sargan-Hansen test is borderline. The results are thus merely suggestive.32
As another test for robustness we replicate the analysis employing the GMM system
estimator (as described above) in Table 5. Again, columns 1 and 2 focus on the ICRG index
of corruption. As the Arellano-Bond test of second-order autocorrelation rejects the null
hypothesis of no autocorrelation, we cannot use lags of order two as instruments. However,
lags of order three and further are still valid as instruments.33 The resulting specification uses
34 instruments; the Sargan-Hansen test does not reject the specifications at conventional
levels of significance. While all control variables except for the lagged dependent variable
are completely insignificant, the impact of corruption remains significant at the 5% level,
with a coefficient somewhat smaller than in the 2SLS results of Table 4 (see column 1).
However, as column 2 shows restrictions do not significantly affect corruption when the
GMM estimator is employed.
Columns 3 and 4 again replicate the analysis employing the corruption index of Trans-
parency International instead of the ICRG index. As can be seen, all variables (except for
the lagged dependent variables and monetary growth) are completely insignificant, includ-
ing our variables of interest. However, the sample is reduced to about one-third as compared
to columns 1 and 2, so the results are again rather suggestive.
To summarize, our empirical results are well in line with the theoretical model introduced
in Sect. 2. We find support for our two propositions: Capital account restrictions significantly
increase the level of corruption, while corruption significantly increases the degree of cap-
ital account restrictions in turn. In our regressions, the respective effects of corruption and
capital account restrictions on each other somewhat increase, once taking the endogeneity
into account. However, the impact of capital account restrictions on corruption is not robust
to the method of estimation: it is not significant at conventional levels when estimated with
GMM.
4 Conclusion
We provide a formal model illustrating the mutual relationship between corruption and cap-
ital account restrictions: while higher corruption leads to stricter restrictions, stricter restric-
tions lead to more corruption. Thus, corruption and restrictions reinforce each other. Using
32Note that we also replicated the results employing Tobit rather than OLS to take account of the bounded
nature of our indices. All results are unchanged. They are available on request.
33See Bond and Meghir (1994).
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Table 5 Determinants of corruption and capital account restrictions (panel data, 1984–2002, GMM)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital account Corruption Capital account Corruption
restrictions (ICRG) restrictions (TI)
Lagged dependent variable 0.714 0.451 0.922 0.317
(6.55)*** (2.67)*** (3.53)*** (1.79)*






Left governments, dummy 0.148 0.007
(1.10) (0.03)






Monetary growth 0.000 0.001
(0.51) (3.23)***
Gross domestic savings 0.013 0.009
(1.23) (0.70)
gdp growth −0.008 −0.000
(0.52) (0.01)
Index of democracy −0.013 −0.111
(0.39) (1.26)
Constant 2.443 −1.779 2.232 −0.737
(1.34) (3.44)*** (0.51) (0.68)
Observations 337 350 98 105
Number of countries 74 75 26 28
Sargan-Hansen test (p-value) 0.13 0.27 0.74 0.22
Arrelano-Bond test (p-value) 0.01 0.04 0.14 0.99
Notes: t-statistics in parentheses:
***: significant at the 1% level
**: significant at the 5% level
*: significant at the 10% level
All variables are averages over three years
a panel of 80 countries, we find empirical support for the relationship hypothesized in our
model. Corruption and capital account restrictions are jointly determined. In our model,
corrupt countries are more likely to impose capital controls because corruption reduces a
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government’s ability to collect tax revenue. If controls exist, however, individuals try to
mitigate the burden by offering bribes, thereby increasing corruption.
These results bear important policy implications. They suggest that governments hoping
to increase tax revenue by introducing capital controls must take account of the negative
equilibrium effects of increased corruption and evasion. Introducing or tightening controls
on capital require a careful weighing of the pros and cons of such controls. Individuals often
quickly find ways to circumvent new restrictions so that the net effect on the tax revenue
may well turn out to be small—and may even be overcompensated by the negative effects
of higher corruption. Analogously, attempts to increase the revenue by increasing tax rates
on capital flows may equally raise the level of evasion and avoidance. The possibility of a
vicious circle in which the mutual reinforcement of corruption and controls involves a spiral
of increasing restrictiveness of controls and corruption exists. In equilibrium, the levels of
corruption and restrictions might end up being destructively high.
Moreover, if capital account restrictions become stricter, the level of resources used
for lobbying and rent-seeking activities of investor groups (beyond corruption) in order
to achieve easier restrictions will also rise; similarly, rent-seeking activities of public ser-
vants to achieve stricter controls will likely be intensified when the level of corruption rises.
Heckelman (2000, 2007) and Horgos and Zimmermann (2009) provide recent evidence that
interest group activity significantly decreases the rates of growth and inflation.34 Hence, the
welfare costs of the restrictions-corruption spiral could well be even higher than described
in our model.
In light of the ongoing worldwide financial crisis, calls for stricter regulations abound.
Our study advises treating those calls with caution. Introducing additional capital controls to
fight the effects of the crises (or globalization, as also frequently demanded), might produce
more harm than good, as controls increase corruption, tax evasion and other forms of rent-
seeking.
Clearly, our results do not imply that zero restrictions will always be optimal. They do
imply, however, that one must carefully consider the adverse effects of restrictions beyond
what seems to be the immediate economic effects.
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Appendix A






Range 0 (no corruption) to 6 (highest
corruption).






Range 0 (no restrictions) to 4 (fully restricted).
Index of
democracy
Marshall and Jaggers (2000) Measures the general openness of political




Beck et al. (2001) The probability that two deputies picked at
random from among the government parties
will be of different parties.
Opposition
fractionalization
Beck et al. (2001) The probability that two deputies picked at
random from among the opposition parties
will be of different parties.
Competitive
nomination
Banks (2002) Index: (3) Competitive, (2) Partly




IMF (various years) Dummy is equal to zero if a currency is freely
fluctuating, and 1 otherwise.
Share of
protestants
Treisman (2000), CIA (2002) Protestant population in %.
Openness World Bank (2006) The sum of exports and imports of goods and
services measured as a share of GDP.
Government
revenue
World Bank (2006) General government final consumption
expenditure in % of GDP.
ln(gdp per capita) World Bank (2006) GDP divided by midyear population (in
constant US $).
Illiteracy rate (%
of people ages 15
and above)
World Bank (2006) The fraction of people ages 15 and above who
cannot, with understanding, read and write a
short, simple statement on their everyday life.
Socialist
governments
Beck et al. (2001) Chief Executive’s party is defined as




Dreher (2006) Index constructed with principal components
analysis. The weights obtained for the
components are 0.08 (assassination), 0.1
(strikes), 0.25 (guerrilla warfare), 0.15 (crisis),
0.16 (riots) and 0.27 (revolutions).
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Table A.1 (Continued)
Variable Source Definition
Banking crises Glick and Hutchison (2005) Dummy takes value of one if a crisis occurred
that year, zero otherwise.
Currency crises Glick and Hutchison (2005),
Capiro and Klingebiel (2003)
Dummy takes value of one if a crisis occurred
that year, zero otherwise.
Monetary growth World Bank (2006) Money and quasi money growth (annual %).
Gross domestic
savings
World Bank (2006) Gross domestic savings are calculated as GDP
less final consumption expenditure.
ln(population) World Bank (2006) All residents regardless of legal status or
citizenship.
gdp growth World Bank (2006) Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at
market prices based on constant local currency.
Appendix B
Table B.1 Descriptive statistics
Mean St.dev. Min Max
Corruption (ICRG) 2.81 1.02 0.00 6.00
Corruption (TI) 3.43 1.70 0.00 7.45
Capital account restrictions 2.43 1.16 0.00 4.00
Index of democracy 3.85 3.74 0.00 10.00
Government fractionalization 0.17 0.26 0.00 1.00
Opposition fractionalization 0.47 0.30 0.00 1.00
Competitive nomination 1.38 0.65 0.00 3.00
Fixed exchange rate 0.59 0.46 0.00 1.00
Share of protestants 0.40 2.68 0.00 31.64
Openness 67.35 36.38 1.60 264.79
Government revenue 21.91 9.72 2.69 53.79
ln(gdp per capita) 7.08 1.12 4.73 9.48
ln(population) 16.13 1.61 11.97 20.95
Illiteracy rate (% of people ages 15 and above) 29.13 22.77 0.20 91.08
Socialist governments 0.31 0.45 0.00 1.00
Political instability 0.25 0.40 0.00 4.21
Monetary growth 72.30 420.82 −10.52 7630.39
Gross domestic savings 16.98 12.09 −39.51 60.72
gdp growth 2.80 4.01 −20.05 14.98
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Appendix C
Table C.1 Countries included in







Brazil Jamaica Saudi Arabia
Bulgaria Jordan Senegal
Cameroon Kenya Sierra Leone
Chile Korea, Rep. Slovak Rep.
China Latvia South Africa
Colombia Lithuania Sri Lanka
Congo, Dem. Rep. Madagascar Syrian Arab Rep.
Congo, Rep Malawi Tanzania
Costa Rica Malaysia Thailand
Croatia Mali Togo
Czech Republic Mexico Trinidad and Tobago
Dominican Republic Morocco Tunisia
Ecuador Myanmar Turkey
Egypt Namibia Uganda
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